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Abstract. We propose an abstract formalism for program testing which extends a previous paper 
of Goodenough and Gerhart. We define the notion of a battery of tests for a given testing context. 
Its properties are studied: reliability, validity, bias and acceptability. A preorder is defined and 
studied, which yields an equivalence relation among batteries of tests. This equivalence turns out 
to be of great interest, both theoretical and practical. 
We study the application of this model to some classical questions: effective (automatic) test 
generation, test optimization, quality assessment of the testing process, and relationships between 
program proving and program testing. 
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Introduction 
Program testing, as Goodenough and Gerhart stated some years ago [9], is certainly 
the most widely used way of assessing program correctness. It is also certainly one 
of the least studied from a theoretical viewpoint. 
Program testing is a part of the program validation process. To validate a program, 
or better, a given implementation f this program, is to decide, with a certain level 
of confidence, whether this implementation is correct or incorrect with respect o a 
given specification. We are here mostly interested in functional specifications (a 
compiler specification for example). The many problems arising in a rigorous 
approach to program validation have been often analyzed [1, 2, 6, 12]. 
It has been written that program testing and program proving are essentially two 
complementary activities, both supporting program correctness assessment [8]. 
Program proving has received for a long time some very strong and efficient 
theoretical interest, whereas program testing has been regarded as an empirical and 
less interesting problem. Some formalization attempts may be found in the scientific 
literature, but, to our opinion, they do not seem to have tackled the problem at an 
abstract enough level. 
In this paper, we propose an abstract formalism for program testing notions which 
extends Goodenough and Gerhart's proposal [9]. It uses first-order predicate logic 
as an underlying mathematical tool (see [13] for an introduction to mathematical 
logic). Its design is intended to meet two requirements: 
(1) to be as faithful as possible to the common intuitive understanding of program 
testing (for a discussion about this point, see [2]); 
(2) to be as faithful as possible to the internal requirements of our underlying 
mathematical tool, remaining at an abstraction level which enables ome powerful 
references to testing theory, putting into evidence their complementary. 
Section 1 sums up briefly some earlier work in this area of research and states 
the basic framework of this work: the testing process diagram. 
Main definitions are then stated: testing context, and battery of tests for a given 
testing context. 
The basic properties of a battery of tests are studied in Section 3: projective 
reliability, asymptotic validity, lack of bias, acceptability. Testability of specifications 
is discussed according to their syntactical form. 
Section 4 is devoted to (pre-) ordering testing contexts and batteries of tests for 
a given context according to their 'quality'. The notions of conservative context 
restriction and asymptotic sharpness are introduced. The equivalence relation 
deduced from the latter is studied, and yields the Equivalence theorem: two compar- 
able acceptable batteries of tests are in fact equivalent. 
Application to practical problems about testing is finally discussed: effective test 
construction method, test optimization, testing assessment. 
In conclusion, we consider the expressive power gained by using a sound but 
rather heavy mathematical tool. It makes more precise the better understanding we 
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have got about the relationships between testing and proving. Some further esearch 
goals are described. 
"We know less about the theory of testing 
that we do often 
than about the theory of proving 
that we do seldom. 
This paper is a step toward redressing 
this imbalance." 
Goodenough and Gerhart [9] 
1. Background: The testing process diagram 
We sum up here briefly some of the main attempts to express what it is to test a 
program. Rather than describing their very technical details, we shall emphasize 
the intuitions which underlie them. We then describe a general model for the testing 
process: the testing process diagram. This model can be mainly characterized by a 
formal approach and an asymptotic approach to the notion of testing. 
1.1. Goodenough and Gerhart's proposal 
Goodenough and Gerhart [9] were some of the first to proclaim the need for a 
testing theory bearing comparison to proving theory. As a first attempt o solve this 
problem, they described the following notions. 
Consider a given implementation of a program, say F, working over an input 
domain D. Suppose that, for each data d of D, one is able to decide whether the 
implementation behaves correctly or not with respect o the given specification. This 
induces a (calculable) predicate over D, say OK ; OK (d) means that the implementa- 
tion behaves 'correctly' for d e D. The correctness of the implementation with respect 
to the specification is thus expressed by Vd ~ D OK(d). 
In this framework, a test can be viewed as a subset of D, say T (authors seem 
to allow an infinite subset of D to be a test in their sense). The elements of T can 
be called test cases, or elementaryexperiments. 
One of the main ideas is that "test cases are chosen typically to satisfy some data 
selection criterion, C, where C denotes a predicate over subsets of D" .  T is a test 
if and only if C(T) .  Thus, a key to testing theory is to focus on the properties of 
a criterion with respect o a certain predicate OK over D instead of considering 
the properties of a test. 
Those authors define two fundamental properties for a criterion C. Reliability 
"refers to the consistency with which results are produced, regardless of whether 
the results are meaningful". It can be expressed by 
RELIABLE(C) 
= (VT~, T2_ D)[(C(T~) ^  C(T2))-> 
(SuccESSFUL( T 1 )4--~ SUCCESSFUL(72)  ], 
where SUCCESSFUL(T) =--- V t ~ T OK ( t). 
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On the other hand, validity "refers to the ability to produce meaningful results, 
regardless of how consistently such results are produced". It can be expressed by 
VALID(C) = (Vd ~ D) [~OK(d)~ (:1 T_  D) (C(T )  v 7SuccEsSFUL( T))]. 
Obviously a 'good' criterion should be both reliable and valid. Such a criterion is 
said to be ideal The successful execution of any test satisfying such a criterion 
demonstrates the correctness of the implementation with respect o the specification. 
Let us point out some features of the above proposal. Note first that it is based 
on the functional behaviour of the implementation being tested (we use the word 
'implementation' where they used the word 'program' to underline this fact). Correct- 
ness has nothing to do with the internal structure of the program or of the machine 
executing it. Then, a first-order logic-like language arises naturally as the best choice 
for dealing with those objects, though the reasons for this choice are not stated by 
those authors. Note that a sentence like V d ~ D OK (d) can be more clearly expressed 
by ~ ~Vd OK(d),  where 9 is the obvious structure with universe D. 
The most important feature of the proposal is, to our mind, the notion of a criterion 
and the properties which are defined about it. 
Notice that passing any test satisfying an ideal criterion demonstrates the correct- 
ness. So testing is viewed as a special case of proving with certain restrictions on the 
kind of proof that is used. It must in fact be split into a transcendental part (proving 
ideality of the criterion and adequacy of the test) and a calculable part (running 
the test cases). 
Lastly, it should be noticed that such a formalism is "anisotrope' with respect o 
correctness. It only deals with successful execution of test cases, and does not say 
anything about failure. In fact, any failure demonstrates, in this case, the uncorrect- 
ness of the implementation. But we feel that this 'anisotropy' is a general feature 
in this area. The famous Dijkstra's tatement "Program testing can be used to show 
the presence of bugs, but never to show their absence!" should be understood in 
this context. Any testing theory should focus rather on success of tests than on 
failure, because only the former is actually informative. 
1.2. Related work 
Several authors, following the above paper, have described related notions. 
Weyuker [14] has shown the extreme importance of the so-called Oracle Problem 
captured above by the predicate OK. One must be able, in a sensible way, to decide 
whether a given test has been passed or not. It follows that a test should contain 
at most a finite number of test cases, the successful execution of each being decidable. 
This will lead us to the notion of an experiment. 
Weyuker and Ostrand [15] have pointed out the central problem in the testing 
area, that is, to infer an infinitary conclusion (Vd ~ D OK(d))  from some finite 
knowledge (Vt~ TOK(t)) ,  where T is a finite subset of D. We thus need some a 
priori infinitary hypothesis. They claim the need to part the domain D into sub- 
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domains that are uniform with respect o correctness. Whenever any data in such 
a subdomain is correctly handled, so are all of them. A uniform subdomain Di of 
D is thus such that [ ( : ld~Di  OK(d))~(Vd~Di OK(d))] or, more clearly, 
~[3d(d  ~ Di ^  OK(d))]~ [Vd(d ~ Di~ OK(d))]. We will call such a hypothesis 
a uniformity hypothesis. Notice that it is only concerned with the specification (the 
predicate OK) and the given implementation (the structure ~), but not with the 
selection criterion. It is only a postulate about the testing context independent of 
the criterion being used. 
Budd, Lipton, Sayward and De Millo [5], followed by Howden [11] have been 
developing a genuine approach to testing that is called mutation testing. Its most 
important feature is, to our opinion, the consideration not only of the implementation 
to be tested, but instead of a "neighbourhood of potential implementations". This 
expresses the idea that we do not know perfectly the implementation we are testing, 
but only to some extent. We thus have to deal with a set of potential implementations, 
which the actual one is known to belong to, without being able to pick it out 
precisely. Any definition we state should only depend on this set rather than on the 
actual implementation. It must be uniform with respect o this set of objects. 
This set itself is, in practice, only known through certain hypotheses about the 
implementation to be tested (among them are, for example, some uniformity 
hypotheses). Thus, the properties of a selection criterion must depend on those 
formal hypotheses, rather than on the actual implementation being run. We will refer 
to this principle as the formal approach to the notion of testing. 
The advantages of this approach are twofold. Though we are only considering 
implementations as functions, the description of the set of potential implementations 
will take account of the syntactical features of the given program. It will in fact 
most likely contain the syntactical mutants of this program, as described by the 
above authors. 
On the other hand, this makes the properties of a criterion independent of the 
syntactical evolutions of the program (design improvements), which is highly 
valuable. 
Complementarity between testing and proving has been advocated by Gerhart 
[8]. Depending on the correctness assessment which is considered, one or the other 
can be used. Geller [7] shows that both methods can even be mixed together to 
demonstrate hat a given property holds. Testing demonstrates that it holds in some 
particular cases. One then proves that this implies that it holds in all cases. Our 
theory of testing is specially designed to put into evidence this complementarity. 
Testing is shown to be a particular kind of proof. Also, extrapolating testing to 
infinity (infinite cost, infinite information) is shown to prove correctness with 
certainty. 
Gourlay's testing theory [10] provides a unified mathematical framework for most 
classical testing methodologies, extending Goodenough and Gerhart's proposal. Its 
theory is mainly concerned with the abstract reliability (not to be confused with our 
projective reliability) of test methods with respect o a set of programs and a set of 
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specifications. Our theory rather focuses on conditions which let a test method be 
effective, or at least as effective as proving (oracle problem). Those theories of 
testing were designed independently but are very similar in their results. 
1.3. Reliability, validity and bias 
Let us focus on the fundamental properties defined by Goodenough and Gerhart. 
Firstly, reliability means that all the tests selected by a reliable criterion are equivalent 
with respect o the correctness assessment of the implementation. Such a criterion 
should be viewed as 'flat', just as a partial order is. It is obviously more interesting 
to consider some more complex criteria, where test power (and cost) may vary. It 
suffices, in fact, to find one test for each level of power (or cost). We are thus led 
to consider, rather than a fiat ordering, a total ordering, for example natural numbers 
~. Reliability expresses in this case that a test which is 'higher' than another is better 
for correctness assessment. We call this notion projective reliability. 
Validity of a criterion C expresses that, for each 'error' in implementation 
behaviour, one can find in C an adequate test. But we are now dealing with a chain, 
and we can consider the 'limit' of the tests of C, which is more powerful than any 
of them, and which can be 'approximated' as closely as wanted if a sufficient cost 
is allowed. A sensible condition is thus to require this limit test to be adequate for 
any 'error'. This means that the above adequate test may be rejected to infinity. This 
is the main feature of what we call the asymptotic approach to the notion of testing. 
We will thus consider asymptotic validity. 
However, our feeling is that those two notions are not able to give a precise 
account of the intuitive notion of testing. Statistical test theory is based on the 
notion of bias. A test is said to be unbiased if it is passed by an implementation 
more probably than failed if and only if this implementation is correct. This could 
be described as a soundness property. This property has ben left implicit by Good- 
enough and Gerhart since all the tests they consider are actually unbiased, because 
V d ~ D OK(d)  implies V t ~ T OK ( t ). In other words, whenever the implementation 
is correct, it will pass any test. In our proposal, which deals with a more abstract 
notion of testing, the notion of bias arises naturally as a basic property. 
1.4. Testing process diagram 
We are now in a position to draft the testing process diagram (see top of p. 157). 
It should model the sequence of operations that take place from the definition of 
the property to be tested, up to the decision of whether the implementation is correct 
or not with respect o the above property (specification). 
From the problem to be solved: "Is this implementation correct with respect o 
this specification?", we build, in the representation" phase, an abstract problem, 
(intuitively) equivalent to the concrete one, expressed in first-order logic. This defines 
an initial testing context ~o. 
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concrete 
level 
abstract 
level 
(first-order 
logic) 
implementation 
specification 
I 
representation 
1 
initial testing 
context ~go 
run  
. . . . . . . . . . . .  --~ test T . . . . . . . . .  ~ conclusion 
T 
application 
battery of tests 3- 
const ruct ion  
We construct for this testing context an acceptable battery of tests exactly as 
Goodenough and Gerhart were seeking an ideal criterion. However, this will not 
be possible in general, because at this point we do not have enough knowledge 
about the implementation to create any precise enough test. 
We thus have at first to postulate some new hypotheses about the implementation 
(uniformity hypotheses, typically). We thus restrict he initial context ~o to a new 
context (~1, for which we can effectively construct an acceptable battery of tests 3-. 
Of course, new hypotheses must be consistent with the property to be tested; the 
restriction must be conservative. Note that the construction phase is entirely abstract, 
and deals only with first-order logical objects. 
Having obtained an abstract battery of tests, we can pick some test from it, 
according to our quality/cost requirements, and apply it to the given problem, 
leading to the conclusion. 
2. Basic notions: Testing context and battery of tests 
2.1. Mathematical tools 
Most of the work in the area of program testing has been carded out in a logic-like 
mathematical framework ([5, 8, 15, 16], etc.) We choose also first-order mathematical 
logic as a basis for this work. Yet, one must look carefully at the results we get. 
They are direct consequences of this choice. Another one, say statistical test formal- 
ism for instance, would probably have led to a very different approach. 
We use mainly the notation of [13]. Logical validity is denoted by ~ and formal 
provability by ~. We consider here only first-order languages L. A language is 
identified with its set of non-logical symbols. If S is a set, L(S) is the language 
obtained by adding to L the members of S as constants. Extension of languages is 
denoted by ~_. I f  L_  L', then L(S)~_ L'(S). 
Given a language L and a set S we consider structures obtained by giving meaning 
to the symbols of L. A structure for L over S yields canonically a structure for L(S) 
over S. Both will be identified. 
A theory T on a language L is a set of L-formulas (axioms). TU T' denotes the 
set-theoretic union of T and T'. Observe that ~ TU T' iff ~ T and ~ T'. T is a finite 
theory if it contains a finite number of (non-logical) axioms. 
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We write T~ T' if all the axioms of T' can be proved using those of T. If T~- T' 
and T'~- T then T and T' are formally equivalent TI--q T'. Observe that T~ ( T1 II T2) 
iff Tb-T1 and T~-T2. 
Most of our statements will be split into a logical part and a formal part. The 
logical part expresses as precisely as possible the intuition one has in mind. The 
formal part is usually more restrictive and, as a rule, it implies the logical one. On 
the other hand, it allows for handy mathematical treatment. This duality principle 
will be shown to be a very fair bridge between practice and theory. 
2.2. Testing context 
We make more precise the components of the testing process diagram. Let us 
first turn to the notion of testing context. This notion should model the problem to 
be solved (i.e., "Is the implementation correct for the given specification?") indepen- 
dently of the battery of tests we will build to solve it. 
Recall that we are interested in the validation of large programs, for example 
compilers. They are considered by (most) users as 'black boxes'. Users are only 
concerned with input/output behaviour, and generally not with their internal struc- 
ture. An abstract data type-like model thus arises naturally. An implementation will 
be so modelled by its functional behaviour. In the first-order logic formalism we 
use it will be thought of as a structure. 
We thus take a universe S, usually the domain of the program, and a language 
L, containing usually at least the functional symbols occurring in the program, plus 
a symbol representing its functional behaviour. The model of our implementation 
will be an L(S)-structure b~. But, as we argued before, we must not only deal with 
one implementation, but with a family of potential implementations, to which 
belongs the one under test. We thus deal with a family (Se) of L(S)-structures. 
The given specification to be tested can usually be modelled by a set of first-order 
formulas. The implementation is then correct if and only if the actual structure 
abstracting it (recall that we do not know which one it is) validates those formulas. 
It is not restrictive to consider a (first-order) theory A whose non-logical axioms 
are those formulas. 
2.1. Definition. A testing context c@ is a 4-uple (L, S, (Se), A) where L is a first-order 
language; S is a set; (Se) is a family of L(S)-structures; A is an L(S)-theory. 
2.2. Example. Consider, as an example, that we are testing a square-root program 
P, which should output the square-root of any natural number given as input. Then 
a sensible testing context c¢ = (L, S, (Se), A) would be the following: 
- L= {F; .  2;. <~. <. ; .  +.  }, the symbol F represents the functional behaviour of 
the implementation; 
- S=N;  
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_ (Se) could be the family of the L(S)-structures uch that the symbols of L 
different from 'F '  have their standard meanings, and such that F has a calculable 
meaning; 
- A={Vx[F (x )2<~x <(F(x )+ 1)2]}. 
Notice that many first-order formulas are validated by all the structures of the 
family (~):  for example, 0+ 1 = 1 or Vn[n <~ n + 1 < n +2]. These formulas can be 
viewed as some formal hypotheses about the implementation being tested. Again, 
it is not restrictive to structure them in a L(S)-theory H. 
This theory H captures formal knowledge we a priori postulate about the 
implementation. We may, for example, postulate that the implementation is not 
'too' incorrect: take H = {Vx[0 ~< F(x)2 ( (x + 10)]}. Then we need only to consider 
those structures which actually validate H. 
2.3. Definition. Let ~ = (L, S, (Se), A) be a testing context, and let H be an L(S)- 
theory, c@ is an H-context if every structure of (Se) validates H. 
Notice that though the family (Se) is a part of the testing context, H is not. Even 
if the actual conditions of the testing process do not change, the formal knowledge 
we make postulates about may vary (in most cases increase) during the testing 
process. 
2.3. Battery of tests 
We can now define what a battery of tests for a given context is. As we saw in the 
first section, a test for a given problem (a given testing context) is a finite set of 
experiments. An experiment is a question about implementation whose answer can 
be decided finitarily. 
2.4. Definition. Let c@ = (L, S, (Se), A) be a testing context. An experiment E for 
is a (closed) L(S)-formula without quantifier, such that for any non-logical symbol 
p of E and for any structure ~ of (Se), the meaning of p in ~ is calculable. 
We do not want to make more precise what 'calculable' means; in most cases, 
S = N and we will use the classical definition of a calculable function (predicate). 
We just note that a (theoretically) calculable, but extremely complex function should 
not, in practice, be considered to be a 'humanly'  calculable one. This is the so-called 
Oracle Problem [14]. 
2.5. Definition. Let cg = (L, S, (Se), A) be a testing context. A test T for c¢ is an 
L(S)-theory with only a finite number of non-logical axioms (finite theory), each 
of them being an experiment of cg. 
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Note that the property that T is a test does not depend on A (the property to be 
tested), but only on L, S and (6e) (the postulated features of the implementation). 
The distinction between experiment and test is only a matter of convenience, as a 
test can always be identified with the conjunction of the experiments it is made up 
of. 
Let us now turn to the definition of a battery of tests for a given context. It must 
cover the formal approach and the asymptotic approach we have outlined. A battery 
of tests should be a family of tests, ordered by a quality criterion that depends only 
on some formal hypotheses about the implementation. Two batteries of tests built 
on distinct formal hypotheses must, in our approach, be considered to be distinct. 
2.6. Definition. Let ~ = (L, S, (~),  A) be a given testing contest. A battery of tests 
3-for ~ is a pair (H, (Tn)n~) where H is an L(S)-theory such that ~ is an H-context 
(valid formal hypotheses); (Tn),~N is a family of tests for ~ such that for all 
n ~ t~ T,+I II H ~- T~ (formal projective reliability). 
The second condition is discussed more extensively in Section 3.1. We note here 
that, for any structure 6e of (b~), and any n ~ •, if 5e~ T,+I, then 6e~ T,: tests T, 
are more and more precise, uniformly with respect o (~). These properties thus 
express the essence of the asymptotic approach. 
We sometimes write (T,) instead of (H, (T~),~)  for the sake of conciseness. 
2.7. Examples. We consider c¢ = (L, S, (S¢), A) with L = {P}, S = N, A = {Vx P(x)}, 
and (6e) being the family of the L(S)-structures such that P has a calculable meaning. 
c¢ is a 0-testing context. 
(1) Take 3-= (H, (T,),~N), with H =0 and T, =0Vn eN. 3"- is actually a battery 
of tests for ~. It is called the empty battery of tests for ~. 
(2) Take #-=(H,  (T , ) ,~)  with H=¢ and T, ={P(0)^- . .^  P(n)}. f f  is also a 
battery of tests for c¢. It corresponds to the exhaustive testing strategy for A; if a 
structure 6e validates all the T,, then 6e validates A. But notice that H [I,~N Tn does 
not prove A. 
(3) Idem with T, = {P(n) A" • - A P(0)}. This new battery of tests should obviously 
be equivalent o the previous one for any sensible notion of equivalence (and 
fortunately it will, see Section 4.3). 
One can easily generalize these examples with an enumeration (possibly not 
monic) of N. 
(4) Consider ~= (H, (T~),~N) and ~ '= (H',  (T'),~N), two batteries of tests for 
a testing context c~. Then it is easy to prove that J - I I  ~-'= (Hid H' ,  (T, II T ' ) ,~)  
is also a battery of tests for cg. Note that the empty battery of tests is a neutral 
element for union. 
(5) Consider another testing context c~ = (L, S, (Se), A), with L, S and (6e) as 
before, and A = { P(0), P ( 1 ) , . . .  } ( = { P(i),  i ~ N}). Notice that for any L(S) - structure 
6e~{VxP(x)} if and only if 6e~{P(0), P (1 ) , . . .  }, 
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works correctly 
any data. This 
methods where 
in the program. 
but that the latter theory cannot prove the former. Look back at example (2). It is 
still a battery of tests for this new context, but we now have the property 
H [_Jn~N Tn~A. Yet, for any k~l~, H [--]~<k T~A.  
Let us consider a more restricted (and realistic) family (Sf) of potential 
implementations. Consider for example, k ~ r~ being fixed, the theory H 
H={P(O)  A ' ' "  A P(k)-->VxP(x)}. 
This hypothesis means that, for any potential implementation, if this implementation 
for any data of 'complexity' less than k then it works correctly for 
is a basic (but often hidden) hypothesis in path analysis testing 
implicitly the 'complexity' of a data is the 'complexity' of its path 
Consider the H-context ~ = (L, S, (5e), A), with L = {P}, S = N, A = {Vx P(x)} 
and (5e) being the family of all those L(S)-structures 5e such that ~ H and the 
meaning of P for b ° is calculable. Then 3-=(H,(Tn)n~),  with Tn= 
{P(0) ^ " • • 6 P(n)} is a battery of tests for ~¢, with the property H [-J~N Tn~A (in 
fact, HII Tk~-A, and this remark is general, see Section 3.2). 
This kind of hypothesis is called a regularity hypothesis. Another classical (and 
hidden) hypothesis in path analysis testing strategy is the uniformity hypothesis. Two 
data items which follow the same path in the program are equivalent with respect 
to correctness: if one is correctly handled by the implementation, the other will be 
as well. We can give an account of this fact by postulating a hypothesis H = 
{3x P(x)--> Vx P(x)}. These two kinds of hypotheses play an essential role in this 
work. In particular we can see that a regularity hypothesis i minimal in some sense 
in order to get a 'good' battery of tests, and that using different constants leads to 
equivalent batteries of tests (virtual constants). 
3. Fundamental properties of batteries of tests 
We have defined the notions of a testing context and a battery of tests for a given 
testing context. Those definitions extend Goodenough and Gerhart's ones; also, 
they take care of the asymptotic approach to the notion of testing, and of the fact 
that the implementation is only partially known, if not partially specified. 
3.1. Reliability 
The reliability property expresses the internal consistency of the battery of tests 
which is being considered [9, 15]. From our viewpoint, consistency means that a 
test with a higher index is more powerful, with respect o success, than a test with 
a lower index. In fact, for technical reasons, this property was already required 
when we defined a battery of tests for a given testing context. 
3.1. Definition. Let c¢=(L, S , (~) ,A)  be an H-context, and (Tn)n~N a countable 
family of tests for this context. 
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(T,),~N is logically projectively reliable if for every n e N and for every structure 
S¢ of (Se) such that 5e~ T,+I then 5e~ T,. 
( T , ) ,~  is formally projectively reliable if for every n e N T,+I II H ~ T,. 
Obviously, since ~ is an H-context, the second statement implies the first one. 
As we stated before, a battery of tests for a given context (more precisely, its family 
of tests) is formally projectively reliable (and thus, logically too). We will only deal 
with such families of tests: in practice, it would be strange to consider a collection 
of tests (remember that a test is a set of experiments) such that an expensive test 
is not necessarily better than a cheaper one! 
3.2. Validity 
We now turn to validity. Reliability was concerned with the consistency of a 
family of tests. Validity is concerned with its power and its usefulness. Goodenough 
and Gerhart gave a strong definition of this property: a collection (criterion) is valid 
if, whenever the program is incorrect, it fails at least some test. Our formalism allows 
us to give a slightly more general statement: the failed test may be incidentally 
rejected to infinity, i.e. may be (virtually) Too. 
3.2. Definition. Let cg = (L, S, (~),  A) be a testing context, and ~r= (H, (Tn)~N) a 
battery of tests for this context. 
3 is logically asymptotically valid if for every structure ge of (b~), if Ae~ 7", for 
every n ~ ~1 then 5e~ A. 
3-is formally asymptotically valid if t__J,~N T, 11 H i -A .  
Again, the second statement implies the first one, because very b ~ of (Ae) is such 
that b~ H. Notice that by (formal projective) reliability, the first statement is 
equivalent to the following one: 
for every re e (Se), there exists ns~ ~ • such that 
i f re~ T, Vn >- ns~, then 6e~A. 
In the same way, the second one can be written 
3no~N [ I T,,I IH~A.  
n~n o 
These facts justify the informal description stated above. As before, we write validity 
for logical or formal asymptotic validity when the addressed property is evident. 
3.3. Examples. (1) Let cg be a context, and ~r=(H, (Tn)n~), with H=O, Tn =0 for 
all n ~ [~. 3- is formally valid (for c¢) iff A = 0. 
(2) Let c~ = (L, S, (~),  A) be a context and ~r= (A, (Tn)n~N) a battery of tests for 
c¢. This implies that every structure ~e of (Ae) is a model of A, i.e., the property 
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being tested is satisfied by all the potential implementations being considered. 3- is 
formally valid for ~. 
(3) Let ~ = (L, S, (Se), A) be a context, with L = {P}, S = N, A = {Vx P(x)}, and 
(5 D) being the family of all the L(S)-structures uch that P has a calculable mean- 
ing. Take T, ={P(0)  ^ - • • ^  P(n)}. Then 3-=(0, (T,),~N) is a logically asymp- 
totically valid battery of tests for ~, but not a formally valid one, because 
{e(n), n ~[~}~ Vx P(x). 
(4) Take ~ as in (3), but restrict (5e) to those structures uch that 5e~ H, with 
H = {P(0) ^ .  • • ^  P(k)--> Vx P(x)}. Then 3- is formally valid. Notice that this does 
not depend on the value of k: k is called a virtual constant. In the example (3), we 
had virtually k = oo. H is called a regularity hypothesis. 
(5) As (4), but now with H = {3x P(x)--> Vx P(x)} the same conclusions hold. 
Following Weyuker and Ostrand [15], H is called a uniformity hypothesis. 
Notice that in Example 3.3(4), 3- is in fact valid in a stronger sense, since 
H U Tk ~-A. This fact is general indeed. More precisely, we define the finite validity 
as follows. 
3.4. Definition. Let rg =(L, S, (5e), A) be a testing context, and 3-= (H, (T.),,~N) a 
battery of tests for c¢. 3" is formally finitely valid if 3 no ~ M T,, o U H [- A. 
Note that if 3- is finitely valid then Vn >I no T, U H~-A, so 3- is formally asymptoti- 
cally valid. Recall that afinite theory is a theory having only a finite set of non-logical 
axioms. A straightforward consequence of the compactness theorem of the first-order 
logic is the fol lowing. 
3.5. Compactness Theorem. Let ~ = (L, S, ( 6e), A) be a testing context, with A a finite 
theory, and 3- a battery of tests for ~. 3- is formally asymptotically valid iff it is formally 
finitely valid. 
Proof. I f  3- is asymptotically valid, H t J ,  T~ ~- A. But each non-logical axiom of A 
can be proved by using only finitely many axioms of H [__J, 7",. Because of the 
finiteness of A, we can find ib . . . ,  ip such that HU T~,U. • -U Tgt-A. Take no = 
sup{/h . . . ,  ip}. By reliability, 
HIIT.o~-HUT~  for k= 1 , . . . ,p .  
So HU T,o~-A. [] 
Thus, if A is finite, our definition is nothing more than a restatement of the 
previous one. If  A is not finite, this is not true. Take H=0,  A={P(n) ,  neM}; 
T, = {P(0) ^ .  • • ^  P(n)} is formally asymptotically valid, but not finitely valid. 
Example 3.3(3) shows that no logical dual of this theorem may be expected. In 
this case, and in many others, formal properties are more fruitful in their theoretical 
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consequences than the logical ones. They allow us to understand better the relation- 
ships between the many objects we are dealing with. On the other hand, they are 
sometimes too strong with respect o our intuitive perception of the testing process, 
which leads us to use logical definitions. Our approach, taking account of duality, 
is a possible mathematical  answer to bridge the gap between theory and practice. 
3.3. Bias 
The concept of bias is fundamental in statistics. A (statistical) test is said to be 
unbiased if it leads to the fight conclusion with a higher probability than to the 
wrong one. Because we do not have any probabil ity concept in our formalism, we 
simply state that a battery of tests is unbiased if any correct implementation passes 
all the tests. So, if the tested implementation fails a test, we can conclude that it is 
certainly incorrect with respect to the considered specification. This is therefore a 
basic requirement for a battery of tests. 
3.6. Definition. Let rg = (L, S, (5e), A) be a testing context, and let ~-= (H, (T,),~N) 
be a battery of tests for this context. 
~- is said to be logically unbiased if for every structure 5e of (5e) such that 6e~ A 
then 5e ~ T, for all n E N. 
is said to be formally unbiased if HIIA~-7", Vn EN. 
Once again, the second statement implies the first one. Both are the converses of 
the corresponding asymptotic validity definitions. A similar property is stated by 
Gourlay [10]. In fact, lack of bias was implicit in most of the previous work on this 
subject. Let us consider for example Goodenough and Gerhart's theory. A test T 
is a (finite) subset of the input domain D of P. The implicit theory associated with 
it is 
T={VtE  TOK(t)}. 
The implicit theory A to be tested is 
A={Vd E D OK ( d)}, 
i.e., the program is correct for every input value. But, of course, A~ T, so the criterion 
C = { T} is formally unbiased. Our formalism is more general than their's, and allows 
us to point out this property, left implicit so far. 
3.7. Examples. (1) Let ~ be a context, and ~=(H,  (T,),~N), where H=O, T, =~) 
for all n E N. ~- is formally unbiased. 
(2) Take now J= {A, (T,),~N); it is unbiased too. 
(3) Take S = N, H = 0, A = {Vx(-a(x = 0) -> P(x))};  let (6e) be the family of the 
L(S)-structures such that P has a calculable meaning. Then T ,= 
{P(0)^.  • "AP(n)}  is biased (not even logically unbiased). But T '= 
{P(1) A" • • A P(n)} for n I> 1 with To = I~ is unbiased. 
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(4) (non-calculable properties) Consider the case where a property about a non- 
calculable symbol is being tested. The natural way to test it is to consider a stronger 
calculable property. Take S =N, H = {Vx(Q(x)~ P(x)}, A= {P(0)}, with (Sf) the 
family of the L(S)-structures such that Q (and not necessarily P) has a calculable 
meaning. The natural battery of tests is then T, = {Q(0)}. It is valid, but biased. 
(5) (existentialproperties) Take S = N, L = {P}, A = {3x P(x)}, and let (6e) be the 
family of the L(S)-structures uch that P has calculable meaning. Take H = ~. It 
can be shown that the only ~-=(H,  (T , )n~)  unbiased in the context c¢= 
(L, S, (6e), A) is such that T, = ~ for all n e N. 
If  we can now restrict (6e) to those structures that validate H= 
{3xP(x)~P(O)v" • .vP(k)} ,  with k a (virtual) constant, then T ,= 
{P(0) v- • • v P(k)} is unbiased (and valid), but depends on k. 
3.4. Acceptability 
We can now define what a 'good' battery of tests for a given problem is. We do 
not want to reject a correct program, so we need the lack of bias property. We 
obviously cannot demand conversely, that a program which passes some test is 
necessarily correct. Yet we can require that any incorrect program fails some test, 
namely asymptotic validity. 
3.8. Definition. Let ~ be a testing context, and f f  a battery of tests for this context. 
is said to be logically acceptable if it is logically asymptotically valid and 
logically unbiased. 
is said to be formally acceptable if it is formally asymptotically valid and 
formally unbiased. 
From the previous remarks, it is obvious that formal acceptability implies logical 
acceptability. With the now usual notation, logical acceptability means that for every 
structure 6e of (Se) 
6e ~ T. for all n ~ N itt 5e ~ A. 
Formal acceptability simply means 
H U TnHHIIA, 
hEN 
i.e., with respect o H (the formal hypotheses about the program), A (the property 
being tested) is equivalent to II n~ Tn (which can be viewed as T~). 
We define a 'good' battery of tests for a given context as a (formally) acceptable 
one. As we pointed out before, a natural choice might rather have been logical 
acceptability. But in this case, the acceptability of a given battery of tests would 
have been very strongly dependent on the underlying testing context (more precisely, 
on (b")). The context can be viewed as the way of using the battery of tests, and in 
practice, it is not a well-defined entity. Specifically, it is very difficult to define 
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precisely the family (b ~) of all the potential implementations of the program (includ- 
ing incorrect implementations). Therefore, we choose a more intrinsic notion: 
namely, formal acceptability. This property can be stated as an entirely abstract 
relation between abstract entities A, H, and (T~)n~. It therefore depends on the 
way of using the battery of tests only through H, that is the formal hypotheses about 
the implementation being considered. The more precise they are, the closer is this 
notion to logical acceptability. 
3.9. Examples. (1) Let c¢=(L, S, (3),  A) be an A-context. Then J-=(A, (T , ) ,~)  
with Tn =~, is (formally) acceptable. The problem is therefore to describe an 
acceptable battery of tests with hypotheses H as weak as possible. 
(2) Take L = {P}, S = N, H = ~, A = {P(n), n e N}. Let (3)  be a family of L(S)- 
structures such that P has a calculable meaning in each of them; then Tn = 
{P(0) ^ .  • • ^  P(n)} is acceptable. 
(3) The same with A = {Vx P(x)}. Notice that, with respect o (b~), {P(n), n e N} 
and {Vx P(x)} are logically equivalent. But now, (Tn)~N is not acceptable. 
(4) Let us restrict (Ae) to those structures which validate the regularity hypothesis 
H = {P(0) a .  • • ^  P(k)  --> Vx P(x)}, k being a virtual constant. Then ( T , ) ,~  is accep- 
table: it is nothing more than the exhaustive testing strategy. 
(5) Instead of a regularity hypothesis, let us consider a uniformity hypothesis 
14 = {3x P(x) -> Vx P(x)}. Add to the language, if there is not one already, a special 
constant symbol a. Then T, = {P(a)} is acceptable. This is actually the random 
sampling testing strategy. 
(6) (existential properties) In Section 3.3, we examined the case of not purely 
universal properties, for instance 3x P(x). We can construct an acceptable battery 
of tests by assuming the hypothesis H = {3x P(x)--> P(0) v- • • v P(k)).  Note that 
this can be written -qP(0) A • • • A -1P(k) --> Vx -aP(x),  i.e., as a regularity hypothesis 
for -qP. Note also that the natural family of tests is then T~ = {P(0) v. • • v P(k)}, 
which depends on k. In fact, it is not possible to build any acceptable family (T~)n~ 
that does not depend on k. 
This is why we state informally that existential (more precisely not purely uni- 
versal) properties are not testable. Another good reason will be stated in Section 4.1. 
(7) (non-calculable properties) We already noticed that non-calculable properties 
'naturally' lead to biased batteries of tests. 
(8) (mutation testing strategy) This strategy (including testing-quality measure) 
has been described by Lipton et al. (see [5] for details and references). It can easily 
be expressed in our framework. 
Let c¢ = (L, S, (£e), A) be a testing context, and ~r= (H, (T,,)~N) a battery of tests 
for c¢. By the Competent Programmer Hypothesis there exists at least one Ae0 in (ge) 
such that geo~ A. Suppose that (T,)n~N discriminates between the structures of (b°): 
for every pair of distinct structures ~e, b ~' of (b~), there exists n ~N such that 
~[(~e~ Tn) ^  (b"'~ T,)]. Suppose that 8" is (logically) unbiased (this hypothesis is 
in most cases left implicit). Then 8" is logically acceptable for c¢. It suttices to show 
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that it is logically asymptotically valid. Note that, by lack of bias, 5eo~ T, Vn ~ N. 
Consider now any structure Ys  (6e) such that 6e~ Tn Vn ~ N. Because (Tn) discrimi- 
nates between the structures of (6e), we can conclude that 6e actually is 6eo, so that 
6e~A. 
We defined a 'good' battery of tests to be a formally valid and unbiased one. By 
this choice, we got a quite intrinsic notion, which depends on the actual utilisation 
conditions only through the formal hypotheses H. This means that the acceptability 
property is very stable with respect o the evolution of the actual implementation 
being tested. Furthermore, it gives us more confidence when extrapolating, in the 
conclusion of the testing process, the success of one test say Tp, to the success of 
all the tests Tn, n ~ I~. 
4. Order ing contexts  and batteries 
We now turn to some new ideas. In the previous examples we sometimes found 
it necessary to restrict he family of structures (S¢) to construct an acceptable battery 
of tests. That meant hat, in some way, we had obtained more knowledge about the 
program being tested. The new context was then more precise than the old one. 
This remark leads us to a preorder on testing contexts. 
On the other hand, once a context has been given, we need to compare its batteries 
of tests. Thus, we want to describe precisely what to improve, to optimize, a testing 
strategy means. We want to describe, as well, what two equivalent testing strategies 
are. This leads us to a preorder on batteries of tests for a given testing context. The 
induced equivalence turns out to be of great interest. 
4.1. Conservative restriction of a testing context 
In most cases, there does not exist any acceptable battery of tests for a given 
context ~ = (L, S, (b~), A). One reason could be that L does not allow us to express 
precise enough properties. Another more crucial reason could be that (Ae) is too 
large, too heterogeneous. We need to restrict it to a more homogeneous family, but 
without eliminating any correct potential implementations of the program being 
tested. The restriction must be conservative. 
Let L be a language, and L' an extension of L. Let Ae' be an U-structure. We 
denote by ~'IL the L-structure obtained by removing the symbols of L ' - L .  Let A 
be a L-theory. We denote by A[ i, the U-theory having the same non-logical axioms 
as A (but considered as U-formulas). 
4.1. Definition. Let c£ = (L, S, (~e), A) and c¢, = (L', S', (~'),  A') be two testing con- 
texts. ~¢' is a conservative r striction of ~(c£'G ~) if: 
- L' is an  extension of L, 
-S '=S,  
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- (5e')lL(s)~ (5~), 
- A[ L'(~) = A' ;  
- conservation condition: for every structure 5e of (6e) such that 6e~ A, there exists 
a structure 6e' of (Se') such that 
~t l  L( S) = ''~" 
Note that if L' is an extension of L then L'(S) is an extension of L(S). Note, 
too, that for any L'(S)-structure O°', 5e'~ A[L,(S ) iff 5¢'[L(S) ~ A, because we are dealing 
with the same universe S in both cases. It can easily be shown that the relation c__ 
is a preorder on the class of testing contexts. Therefore, by transitivity, we may deal 
only with elementary conservative restrictions, putting them together to get the 
desired result. 
The following theorem shows that a (conservative) restriction cannot, in any case, 
discard any acceptable battery of tests. It is therefore a safe tool. 
4.2. (Conservative) Restr ict ion Theorem. Let c~ = (L, S, (6e), A) be a testing context, 
and let c~,= (L', S', (S¢'), A') be a conservative restriction of  cC Let 3-= (H, ( T . ) ,~}  
be a battery of  tests for cC Let 3-'=(H[L,(S), (T,[L,(S)),~). 
I f  3- is logically acceptable for c~, so is 3-' for c~,. I f  3- is formally acceptable for ~, 
so is 3-' for c~,. 
4.3. Lemma. Let U and V be two L-theories and L' be an extension of  L. Then U F- V 
iff UIL,~- VIL,. 
Proof  o f  Theorem 4.2. We show that 3-' is actually a battery of tests for ~'. Let 
6e' ~ ($1") ; then 6e'[L(S ) ~ (~), 5e'[L(S)~ H and 6e'~ HIL,(S ). Because (SD')IL(s)___ (6e), 
the calculability of the meanings of the non-logical symbols of Tn is preserved. 
Tn[z,(s ) is thus actually a test for c~,. By applying Lemma 4.3 with L(S) and L'(S), 
reliability is obvious. 
Suppose 3- is logically acceptable for ~. For any 6e' ~ (Se') 5e'~ AI L,(s) iff bD'I L(S) ~ A 
iff 5e'lz(s)~ 7". for any n~N (because iff S¢'~ T.[L,(S ) for any n~N. 
Thus 3-' is logically acceptable for c¢,. 
Suppose J- is formally acceptable for ~. By Lemma 4.3, the relation 
H [_J, T. b-q H LA A implies 
HIL,(S ) I I T,,[L,(s)HHIL,(S)I IAIL,(S ), 
n 
which expresses formal acceptability of 3-' for c~,. [] 
Note that the converse of the above theorem is true in the formal case: a battery 
of tests that was not formally acceptable cannot become acceptable as if by (conserva- 
tive) magic! This means that formal acceptability is a rather intrinsic property which 
depends little on the concrete application conditions. Dependence only occurs 
through the formal hypotheses H. 
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Yet, this is not true in the logical case. Logical acceptability may depend on 
external conditions. This feature agrees with practical intuition, but leads to concep- 
tual difficulties. 
Conservative r strictions of testing contexts are used in two main ways in practice. 
On the one hand, we add some new symbols to L, extending the family of structures 
by giving to those new symbols some specific meanings. For instance, in Example 
3.9(5) the new constant symbol a models an arbitrary element of the domain. To 
choose a structure 6e' of the restricted context means to pick up randomly a value 
in S. We thus give a precise model of random sampling strategy. 
On the other hand, we will use some new hypotheses HI about the potential 
implementation, for example the regularity or uniformity hypotheses. We then 
restrict (re) to those structures that validate H1. It can be easily shown that a sufficient 
condition for the restriction to be conservative is A II H ~- H1. The restricted context 
is then an H I I  Hi-context. 
As a special case, we can take n I = A. We then get an A-context. A trivial 
acceptable battery of tests is J -= (A, (T,),~N) with Tn = ~ for all n ~ N. If we consider 
the property to be tested as hypothesis, testing becomes trivial! 
This is why we must only consider some likely hypotheses HI. A must obviously 
not be considered as a likely hypothesis. The regularity or uniformity hypothesis 
may, in most cases. This 'likely' feature will get a crucial place for quality assessment. 
For purely universal properties, the regularity or uniformity hypothesis leads 
actually to conservative r strictions. The reason is that 
[Vx P(x)]->[ P(O) a . . . A P( k)-> Vx P(x)] 
is a theorem (for any k). But this is not true in general. In Example 3.7(5) consider 
the structure ~ such that P~,(x) - - (x= k+l )  then 9P~A={3xP(x)} ,  but 5e does 
not validate/-/1 -- {3x P(x)  -~ P(0) v. • • v P(k)}. The restriction is not conservative; 
we implicitly eliminated some correct potential implementations of our program. 
That is why properties which are not purely universal are not testable in general. 
4.2. Asymptotic sharpness 
We now consider agiven testing context, and its set of batteries of tests. Informally, 
we need to compare two of them with respect o the quality of information we can 
gain. But we consider only positive information, i.e., information about correctness 
of the implementation, and not information about its possible incorrectness. As 
with conservative r strictions, we are interested rather in correct implementations 
than in incorrect ones. 
A battery of tests is sharper than another if the success of its tests implies the 
success of the tests of the other, irrespective of indexes. This is the intuitive, logical 
definition. For the formal one, we have to deal with formal hypotheses H and H'. 
A battery of tests should involve hypotheses as weak as possible, because we do 
not know whether they are actually valid for the actual implementation. Our 
definition must reflect this viewpoint. 
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4.4. Definition. Let cg = (L, S, (S¢), A) be a testing context. Let 3-= (H, (T~),~N) and 
gr'= (H', (T'~),~N) be two batteries of tests for rg. 
J- is logically asymptotically sharper than if '  if for every i e N there exists j e N, 
such that for every structure 5e of (b °) if 5e~ T~ then 5e~ T~. 
~- is formally asymptotically sharper than ~" if Vi ~ I~ ~j ~ I~ HU T~- H' I I  T~ and 
H'l IA~-HI IA. 
As with previous definitions formal sharpness implies logical sharpness. Both of 
them define partial orders on the set of batteries of tests for the context ~. However, 
the logical order is more dense than the formal one. For example, two batteries of 
tests have a logical east upper bound, but not necessarily a formal one. The sharpness 
orderings will be denoted >t. The equivalence r lations canonically associated with 
them will be denoted --- 
4.5. Examples. (1) Let cg =(L, S, (3"), A) be a context, and ~r=(H, (T,,),,~) be a 
battery of tests for cg such that A~ H (this is in practice often true). Then gr,= 
(0, (0 )~)  is a battery of tests for c¢, and ~'<~ ~- strictly. 
(2) Let cg=(L, S, (~) ,A)  be a context, and let gr=(H, (Tn),~N) and 9-'= 
(H', (T ' ) ,~)  be two batteries of tests for c¢. Then J l l  9-' = (H U H',  ( T~ U r ' ) ,~)  
is a battery of tests for cg, and it is the least upper bound of ~r and J-' for logical 
sharpness. If A II H ~-q A U H '  then this holds for formal sharpness as well. 
(3) Let cg be a context, and ~-=(H, (T , ) ,~)  be a battery of tests for c¢. Let 
~ '=(H,  (r')n~N) and ~"=(H,  (T~)~)  with T'~= T2~ and T~= Ttn/2 j. Then ~'  
and ~" are two batteries of tests for ~, formally equivalent to J-. 
(4) Take L={P,Q},  S=N,  H=H'={Vx(Q(x) ->P(x))}.  A={VxP(x)} .  Con- 
sider ~=(H,  (T~),~N) and ~r'= (H', (T',),~N) where Tn = {P(0) ^ .  • -^ P(n)}, T" = 
{Q(0) ^ .  • • ^  Q(n)). Then ~'~> 3- strictly. 
(5) Take L={P},  S=N,  A={P(n) ,neN},  T ,={P(O)^. . .^P(n)} ,  H= 
{P(n), n<~ k, n odd}, H'={P(n) ,  n<~ k, n even}. Consider ~=(H,  (T~)~)  and 
~ '= (H', (T'~)n~). Then ~r--gr,, but HV-H', and H'V-H. 
Properties of  sharpness equivalence will be studied more precisely in the next 
section. The following theorem shows that sharpness ordering is relevant with respect 
to validity and bias. Informally, validity is an increasing property, and lack of bias 
a decreasing one. 
/ 
4.6. Monotony Theorem. Let ~ be a testing context, and let ~ and gr' be two batteries 
of tests for ~g. Suppose ~ is logically (resp. formally) asymptotically sharper than ~'. 
I f  ~' is logically ( resp. formally ) asymptotically valid, so is ~r. I f  ~ is logically ( resp. 
formally) unbiased, so is ~Y'. 
Proof. We consider only the formal case (the logical one can be proved in a very 
similar way). Take ~=(L ,  S, (6e),A), ~-=(H, (Tn)n~N), gr'=(H', (T ' )n~) .  
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Assume that 3-' is valid, and examine H U,, T,,; H I1,, T,,~-H'II T[ and this is 
true for all i ~ N; thus H U ,  Tn ~ H'  I I ,  T' ,  and H'  LJ, T" ~- A by hypothesis. Thus 
H[_Jn T,~-A. 
Assume that 3- is unbiased and examine H 'U  A. Given any n ~ N, H 'U  A ~ H U A, 
and H II A ~ T. by hypothesis. So H ' I I  A ~ T, ; but H'  U At-- H obviously, and thus 
H'  II A ~- H U T., and this is true for all n ~ ~1. Thus H 'U  A ~- H I I ,  T,, and, as we 
have shown previously, H I1~ T~H'  U ,  T'~. Thus H'UA~H'  U,, T'~, and, as a 
consequence H 'U  A~-T'~ for all n ~ N. [] 
4.7. (Counter-)examples. (1) Consider Example 4.5(4); 3-'i> 3-, 3- is unbiased but 
3-' is biased. 
(2) Take L={P}, S=N, A={VxP(x)},  H=O, H '={P(O)^. . .^P(k) -> 
VxP(x)} and 7", ={P(0)  ^ .  • • ^  P(n)}. Consider 3-=(H, (T~),~) and 3-'= 
(H', (T,),~N). Then 3-'-- > 3-, 3-' is valid and 3- is not. 
4.3. Asymptotic equivalence 
We now study the properties of the equivalences induced by the asymptotic 
sharpness. In fact, those preorders, especially the formal one, are rather poor, and 
are mainly valuable because of their induced equivalences. The following theorem 
makes precise the relationships between sharpness equivalence and acceptability. 
4.8. Stability Theorem. Let c£ be a testing context, and 3-, 3-' be two batteries of 
tests for this context. 
I f  3- is logically (resp. formally) acceptable and 3-' is logically (resp. formally) 
asymptotically equivalent to 3-, then 3-' is logically (resp. formally) acceptable. 
In other words, acceptability is preserved by (asymptotic) equivalence. An interest- 
ing fact is that, in practical cases, two acceptable batteries of tests are actually 
equivalent. 
4.9. Equivalence Theorem. Let c£=(L, S, (bD), A) be a testing context, and 3-= 
(H, ( Tn)~N) and 3-'= (H', ( T ' )~)  be two batteries of tests for c£. Suppose that there 
exists a finite sab-theory Ao of A such that AoL]HHAoI IH' (finiteness condition). 
Then, if 3"and 3-' are formally acceptable they are formally asymptotically equivalent. 
Proof. Notice at first that the finiteness condition implies that 
Al l  HHAoU Hk-qAol l H 'HAU H'. 
By acceptability, H U ~ T~ I-~ H II A and H' U n T" H H ' l l  A. Then we have 
H I I T, , t -HUAk-HI IAo~-Ao. 
n 
By compactness we get j such that H U Tj t-Ao. Then 
HU Tj~- HUAo~- H'UAo~- H 'U  T'. 
n 
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Thus for all i ~ N, there exists j ~ ~ such that H II T~ ~- H 'U  T'i. From the first remark, 
H'IIA~-Ht_AA. Thus 3-._-> 3-', and, by symmetry, 3 - -  3-'. [] 
Intuitively, the finiteness condit ion means that 3- and 3-' are not too different 
from one another. The theorem then states that two acceptable batteries of tests are 
either equivalent, or very different. 
Consider such an example. Take L={P},  S =~,  A={P(n) ,  n ~ N} (A must of 
course be infinite!). Let 3-= (/4, (T , ) ,~)  with 
H=O, T , ,={P(O)^. . .^P(n)} ,  
Another example 
{P(O)^. . .^P(n)} ;  
{P(O) ^  . . . ^  P(k)-~ 
condition holds. 
and 3-' = (H' ,  (T ' ) ,~n),  with H '  = A, T" = 0. Then 3- and 3-' are formally acceptable, 
3-'/> 3- but not 3----> 3-'. Notice that HUAHH' I IA .  It can be seen that no finite 
Ao C _ A such that HI IAoHH'UAo exists. 
follows. Take S=N,  L={P},  A={P(n) ,ncN},  T ,=T '= 
take H = {P(0) ^ .  • • ^  P(k) -> Vx P(x)} and H '  = 
P(n), n oN l}. However, in most practical cases the finiteness 
Let ~ be a testing context, and 3- a battery of tests for cC W is (formally) finitely 
acceptable if 3- is formally acceptable and (formally) finitely valid (cf. Section 3.2). 
4.10. Lemma. Let c~ be a testing context, and let 3- and 3-' be two batteries of tests 
for c~. Suppose that 3- and 3-' are (formally) finitely acceptable and are comparable 
with the formal asymptotic sharpness preorder. 
Then the finiteness condition holds. 
Proof. We use the above notation. 
Let us examine 3-. By finite acceptability we get k such that H II Tk ~A. By 
acceptability then, 
H LJ T , ,HHL iAHHU rk. 
n 
By compactness we get a finite subtheory of A, say B, such that 
H L] T,,HHUAI---qHU TkHHUB.  
11 
With 3-', we get in the same way k' and B'. Suppose now 3----> 3-'. From the first 
condition, it can be easily shown that H U ,  T. ~ H '  U ,  T" and thus H II B ~- H '  U 
B'. From the second one we get H'UB '~HI IB .  Take now Ao = BUB' ,  which is 
actually a finite subtheory of A: HUAoHH' I IAo .  [] 
4.11. Corollary. Let 3- and 3-' be two (formally) finitely acceptable batteries of tests 
for a testing context c~. 
I f3- are ;Y-' are comparable with the formal asymptotic sharpness preorder, then they 
are equivalent. 
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In practice, the theory being tested is often finite, and by the Compactness Theorem 
3.5, Theorem 4.9 applies. 
Let us conclude this section by showing that the potential dual statement of the 
Equivalence Theorem 4.9 is not true in general. For this purpose, take S = •, L = 
{P, Q}, A = {VxP(x)};  let (Se) be the family of those L(S)-structures that validate 
H = {(Vx Q(x))~-~(Vx P(x))}, and such that P and Q have calculable meanings; take 
Tn = {P(O)A "" • ^  P(n)}, T '={Q(O)^. . .AQ(n)} .  
Then J -= (H, (T, )n~) and J - '= (H', (T'),~N) are both logically acceptable, but not 
comparable. 
5. Construction, optimization and quality assessment 
Previous sections were devoted to studying, from a theoretical viewpoint, the 
properties of testing contexts and batteries of tests. They have shown that the 
behaviour of those abstract objects may be quite directly related to the common 
intuition about program testing. 
This section describes the application of, this theoretical model to three important 
practical problems: the effective construction of a suitable battery of tests for a 
given problem, the optimization of a given battery of tests according to some given 
criterion, and the global quality assessment of a testing process. 
5.1. Towards an effective construction method 
As shown by the testing process diagram (see Section 1.4) the construction phase 
consists of starting with a testing context C¢o, and defining a new testing context c¢1, 
which is a conservative r striction of C¢o, together with a formally acceptable battery 
of tests ~ for c¢,: 
C¢o ~ ff  acceptable for c¢~, c¢, ~_ c¢0" 
construction 
In practice, we must only deal with 'likely' conservative restrictions. The new 
hypotheses we postulate (regularity or uniformity hypotheses) must be sensible with 
respect o the concrete problem. 
Consider the following example. Let c¢ o = (Lo, S, (Se0), A) be an initial context 
with formal hypotheses Ho. C¢o is an Ho-context. Suppose that A is {Vx ~b(x)} where 
~b is an Lo(S)-formula, without any quantifier, and without any variable but x, such 
that any non-logical symbol of ~b has a calculable meaning for every structure of 
(^Co). Suppose that S is countable, say S = I~. In order to construct 0"- and ~g~, we 
may use two kinds of hypotheses, depending on the practical context. 
(1) Take /-/1 ={~b(0)A-- "A ¢b(k)~Vxcb(x)}, restrict cgo with HI to get an Hot_] 
H~-context c¢~ (notice that Holl A~H~ for any choice of k!). 
Then ff  = (Hot_] H~, (Tn)n~N) with Tn = {~b(0),..., ~b(n)} solves the problem. Note 
that the choice of k does not need to be explicit (exhaustive testing strategy). 
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(2) Add a new constant a to L0, and consider/-/1 ={~b(a)--> Vx ~b(x)}; restrict cgo 
to get c¢~ as above. Again, Holl Ab  H~. Now T, = {~b(a)} solves the problem (random 
sampling testing). 
We thus know how to effectively construct 3- and (~1 for the basic case A = {Vx tkx} 
in many practical problems (other special sensible hypotheses could however be 
used). We now show that the syntactical form of A may be modified. 
5.1. Construction Lemma. Let ~ = (L, S, (6e), A} and 3-' = (L, S, (,Y), A') be two test- 
ing contexts with the same family of L(S)-structures (6P). Let 3-= (H, (T , ) ,~)  be a 
battery of tests for ~. Assume that AU HHA' I  I H. 
Then 3- is an acceptable battery of tests for c¢, if and only if it is so for ~. 
Proof. 3- is obviously a battery of tests for c¢, (this does not depend on A). 
3- is valid for c~,: H I1~ T,~-A (validity for c¢), H U ,  T,~-H, H L J,, T,,~-HU 
Ar -H I IA 'andthusHI  I ,T ,~A' .  
3- is unbiased for c~,: for any n, H [I A ~- T. (lack of bias for c~), and H U A'~- H tl 
The converse is proved by symmetry. [] 
Now, the following Decomposition Theorem transforms the problem of construct- 
ing a battery of tests for a complex theory A into (possibly) infinitely many basic 
problems by splitting A into pieces. 
5.2. Decomposition Theorem. Let q¢ = (L, S, (6e), A) be a testing context, with A a 
countable union A = U ~N AO). 
For each i eN, let ~<i) be the testing context (L, S, (S¢), A°)), and let 3 ~0= 
(H 0), ( T~i)),,EN) be a battery of tests for c~(i). Let H = LJ ~ H 0), 
T. = U T~ O= T~)U "" "U T(. "). 
Then 3-= (H, (T.).~N) is a battery of tests for ~. I f  each 3 ~O is logically acceptable 
for ~o), so is 3-for c~. I f  each 3 ~i) is formally acceptable for ~, so is 3-for ~. 
Proof. (1) 3- is a battery of tests for ~. Fix n. Each T~ ) being a test for ~o) and T. 
being the union of finitely many Tin, T, is actually a test for ~ (~ and qg(i) are built 
on the same (6e)!). 
Each c¢<o is a testing context. For each 6e~ (5e), 6e~ H (°, for each index i; so 
6e~ U~ H°) and 6e~ H. For the same reason, for each index i, H<i)u --.+1TO) --"T~0 for 
each n. Thus 
U (H°)U-n+I,7"°) ~-_ U T~ 0, 
i<~n+l i~n+l  
(HU Tn+0 T., 
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HI I  T,+I ~ I",, which holds for all n. 
We now focus on the formal case; the logical one can be handled in the same way. 
(2) 3- is valid for c¢. Consider H I I ,  i/',. This can be rewritten as 
But, by projective reliability, we have 
H(i)l I T~)~ I1 T(~ ) forall i. 
So (*) proves actually 
U r(#)), 
i n 
and by the validity of 3 -(~) for ~(o, this proves I1~ A (°, that is A. 
(3) 3- is unbiased for ~. Consider HI lA .  This may be rewritten 
I I (H(i)l IA(°). 
i 
By lack of bias of 3 ~i) for ~(~), this proves, for any n, [l~ T~ ° and, as a special case, 
Ilion T(i), that is T.. [] 
Observe that the diagonalization method used to build T, does not work if there 
are uncountably many A (i). 
Given the Construction Lemma 5.1, and the Decomposition Theorem 5.2, we can 
now describe an effective and general method to achieve the construction phase. 
Remember firstly that, following the discussion in Section 3, we only have to deal 
with purely universal 'calculable' formulas. Consider therefore an initial context 
c¢ = (L, S, (Se), A), with A = {Vx Vy ~b(x, y)} with ~b a formula as previously. Suppose 
S=•. 
(1) Firstly, restrict c£ with a uniformity hypothesis HI (or some other suitable 
likely hypothesis) for the formula Vx[Vy 4)(x, y)]. We then obtain cgl = (L, S, (6el), A) 
and /-/1 = {Vy ~b(0, y) A- • • A Vy ~b(k, y) --> Vx Vy ~b(x, y)}. Under /-/1, A is now 
equivalent to 
Al= {Vy dp(i, y), i eN}. 
(2) By the Construction Lemma 5.1, it suffices now to consider the context c£2 
obtained by replacing A with A1 in c¢~. ~g2 = (L, S, (~) ,  A~). 
(3) The Decomposition Theorem 5.2 may now be applied. It suffices to consider 
the (infinitely many) contexts cg(2i) = (L, S, (5e~), A~O), with 
A~') = {Vy ~p( i, y)}. 
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(4) The example described earlier may now be applied. Notice that the Decompo- 
sition Theorem 5.2 can be applied at point (3) precisely because S is countable. 
With an uncountable S, we might not have been able to conclude anything. The 
method can obviously be extended to a more complex A. The following definition 
states ome sufficient practical conditions on the testing contexts that can be handled 
in this way. 
5.3. Definition. "Let ~ = (L, S, (6¢), A) be a testing context, c~ is testable if S is at 
most countable, and A is a theory with at most countably many non-logical axioms 
(countable theory), each of them being a purely universal formula each of whose 
non-logical symbols has a calculable meaning, whatever structure of (9°) is con- 
sidered. 
Notice that if L has at most countably many non-logical symbols (countable 
language), one can always (by the Construction Lemma 5.1) reduce A to a countable 
theory (L(S) being countable). 
5.2. Construction vs. optimization 
We can effectively construct an acceptable battery of tests for a (possibly restricted) 
given testing context. However, it is often the case that this battery of tests is not 
satisfactory, for some practical and/or theoretical reasons. We are thus naturally 
led to the optimization problem with respect o some given criterion. 
Consider firstly the formal sharpness criterion. Given a context ~ and a battery 
of test ~-, which is acceptable for ~, we try to optimize 3- to get a strictly sharper 
acceptable battery of tests. The Equivalence Theorem 4.9 applies (at least if the 
theory to be tested is finite--this is actually often the case). It states that any other 
acceptable battery of tests is in fact equivalent o 3-, and thus can be easily 
characterized. 
We must therefore turn to some more precise criterion which results from some 
external considerations. Those considerations are not, in general, expressible in our 
formalism. They often deal with testing cost or profitability. Nevertheless, we can, 
to a certain extent, provide a method for assessing their legitimacy. 
The idea is to consider the likelihood, the legitimacy, of the hypotheses which 
are involved in sharpness equivalence. Consider the H0-initial context ~0 = 
(L, S, (Seo), A). Ho can be considered as the set of fundamental, initial hypotheses 
about the implementation, whose validity may not be in doubt. 
Now, suppose we have already constructed (probably using the above method) 
an Hol l  Hi-context ~1 = (L, S, (Sel) , A), which is a conservative r striction of ~o (in 
most cases, HoLd A~ H~), and an acceptable battery of tests J -= (Holl/-/1, (Tn)n~) 
for c¢x. /'/1 is a set of technical construction hypotheses, probably uniformity and 
regularity hypotheses, which have been postulated about the implementation for 
theoretical reasons. They should have been carefully chosen as likely hypotheses, 
but in any case they may be considered as less legitimate than the initial hypotheses. 
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Consider now a battery of tests J "= (HoU H~, (T'),~N), which is an optimization 
of 3- according to some external and inexpressible xtra criterion. 8" is equivalent 
to 3-, and we thus have 
HoUH~ U T,,HHoUH, U T'. 
gl n 
This means that, given the initial hypotheses and the construction hypotheses, U n Tn 
and IIn T" are equivalent. We say that this optimization is of level 0 if equivalence 
still holds under the initial hypotheses. Otherwise, it is said to be of level 1. 
A level 0 optimization can be considered as perfectly safe and legitimate. It can 
be seen that a typical optimization of level 0 is to increase the redundancy of the 
battery of tests, by adding some new experiments, already implied by the old ones, 
to the tests. Such an optimization will probably increase the cost of the testing 
process, but also the quality of the conclusion. 
A level 1 optimization must be considered not to be as safe as a level 0 one. A 
typical example is to decrease the redundancy of the battery of tests, and thus the 
cost of the testing process. Consider for example a theory A = {Vx ~b (x)} to be tested 
under a construction hypothesis/-/1 = {3x ~b(x) ~ Vx ~b(x)}; a test {~b(a), ~b(b)} will 
be, at level 1, optimized into {~b(a)}. 
These two kinds of optimization are quite usual in practice and are often left 
implicit. In fact, the word 'optimization' tends to be used when some extra hypotheses 
are involved, leading to some simplifications. In our formalism, we can express this 
by restricting the context once more with a new hypotheses theory/-/2: 
H0-initial context 
construction 
Hi 
H011 Hi-context c¢, 
H0 U H, II HE-context (~2 
optimization 
/-/2 
(remember that conservative restriction is transitive). HE is called the optimization 
hypotheses theory. Such an optimization is said to be of level 2. Such extra hypotheses 
must be considered a priori to be illegitimate and not useful. Their validity should 
be examined very carefully, as should the profitability of such an optimization. An 
optimization of level 2 leads in general to some considerable alteration of the battery 
of tests. 
5.3. Quality assessment ofa testing process 
It is now necessary to face the question of assessing the quality of a testing process. 
Even though we are not able at present o answer this question in a satisfactory 
fashion we will give here some insight into this very difficult but fundamental 
problem. 
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We can now proceed with the discussion of the testing process diagram first 
sketched in Section 1.4: 
Tun 
implementation ............... ~ test T ......... ~ conclusion 
specification 
I 
representation 
1 
initial testing 
context ~o 
application 
battery oftests O- 
construction 
From the implementation features and the specification to be tested, we get an 
abstract version of the problem as an Ho-testing context ~o = (L0, S, (Seo), A). We 
then construct an acceptable battery of tests ~ = (Holl/-/1, (Tn)n~N) for a (possibly) 
conservatively restricted Holl Hi-testing context ~1 = (L1, S, (S¢1), A). In the applica- 
tion phase, we choose a test Tp from (Tn),~ and run it. If Tp is passed, the 
implementation is declared to be correct with respect o the given specification; if
Tp fails, it is declared to be incorrect. 
We suppose that the representation phase is consistent in that the concrete problem 
is intuitively 'correctly' translated into an abstract formulation. As a special case, 
we suppose that there is an (unknown) structure 6er which actually represents the 
implementation functional behaviour. 
Suppose now that the selected test Tp fails. Suppose that the implementation is 
nevertheless correct. Then 6erdA. Because of the conservative restriction, there 
exists 6e'r ~ (~t~l) such that 6e',l~(s ) = 5e, Then by an earlier remark, 5~',~ AlL, is) and, 
by hypothesis, ~' ,~ (/-/oH H1). But, by lack of bias, AIL,(s)ll Holl H~ ~- Tp (in fact 
for any p!). So 5~'~ Tp and we get a contradiction. We then can conclude that the 
implementation is certainly incorrect, whatever the index p chosen. This should be 
related to the discussion of Section 1.1 about testing anisotropy. 
The abov.e proof shows that if the implementation is correct, then all the tests T, 
will be passed. Conversely, suppose that the selected test Tp is passed, and that the 
implementation is not correct. In general we cannot conclude anything. We need 
some extra hypotheses, called coupling hypotheses. 
First coupling hypothesis: Everything happens exactly as if 6e, :.s conserved by the 
restriction: one can find an Se're (5~1) such that 5e'~l~(s ) behaves like 5D,. 
Second coupling hypothesis: Everything happens exactly as if all the tests T,, n ~ [~ 
were passed~instead of Tp only. 
Assume these coupling hypotheses. Because of the validity of J ,  Ho[- 
/-/1 [___], T, ~ A. Thus 5e'~ A (in fact A[ L,(S)) and, by an earlier emark, Ser ~ A, whicll 
leads to a contradiction. The implementation is thus correct. 
We have shown that the quality of the conclusion which our testing process lead.' 
to is actually related to (and only to) these two hypotheses. We may thus identif) 
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them and define the quality of a testing process to be the validity level of those 
hypotheses. 
It should be emphasized that these two hypotheses are essentially of the same 
nature. (5el) may be viewed as a sampling of (6Co), the fairness of which is determined 
by the likelihood of the postulated construction hypotheses/-/1. On the other hand, 
if Tp is passed, then, by reliability, all Tn with n <~ p would have been passed. (Tn)n~p 
may also be viewed as a sampling of (T , )~,  the fairness of which is determined 
by the index p. Thus, in both cases, we state that some results which are formally 
true on a fair sampling of a domain may be considered to be true for any object of 
the domain. This is no more than a special kind of regularity or uniformity hypothesis! 
Such kinds of coupling hypotheses have been used extensively in mutation testing 
[5]. 
Thus we can now (re-)define testing process quality as the fairness of those 
samplings. Remember that restricting the context from c@0 to C@l may be regarded 
as increasing one's knowledge (in fact, by postulating some likely knowledge) about 
the implementation. On the other hand, the criterion for choosing Tp out of ( T,),E~ 
is mainly running cost. Testing process quality is thus directly related, through 
fairness, to 
(1) the quality of information about the tested implementation, 
(2) test running costs. 
It must be verified that perfect information and infinite cost actually lead to a 
perfectly safe testing process conclusion. It is sufficient o look at an incorrect 
implementation. The initial context c@ 0 looks like (L, S, {Se,}, A): the family of 
structures has collapsed to a singleton. Suppose, for the sake of clarity, that A = 
{VxP(x)} and S=N.  There exists an integer k such that ~rV-P(k), so that 
5er ~ {P(0) A" • • ^  P(k) ~ Vx P(x)} (perfect information). We restrict he context C@o 
with this hypothesis to c@~ and take Tn = {P(0) A" • • A P(n)}. We get an acceptable 
battery of tests for c¢~, and we may pick out Tk (infinite cost), which obviously fails. 
The above discussion shows that, under perfect conditions, testing an implementa- 
tion proves its correctness. Proving appears here as a special case of testing, namely 
as an extrapolation of testing to infinity. In practice we are thus led to consider 
program testing as a finite but highly valuable approximation of program proving, 
which is itself, in most cases, quite untractable. This is the very specificity of testing 
to give a continuous graduation of correctness assessments instead of the correct/in- 
correct (often humanly undecidable) alternatives of proving. 
6. Conclusion 
We have presented an abstract formalism for the investigation of program testing. 
This formalism extends Goodenough and Gerhart's one. Its main goal is to put into 
evidence the complementarity between program testing and program proving. 
A specificity of testing is to provide a continuous graduation of correctness 
assessments instead of the correct/incorrect alternatives of proving. In our formal- 
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ism, program testing appears as a particular case of program proving. To test a 
program, one first proves the acceptability of a battery of tests (H, (Tn),~). Then 
one proves the validity of some test Tp by running (evaluating) it. Acceptability 
guarantees continuity: the higher p is, the closer testing and proving are. In other 
words, extrapolating testing to infinity yields actually proving. 
Testing is also essentially an incremental process. To test a program is to increase 
one's confidence and one's knowledge about it. Earlier theories of testing concen- 
trated on the notion of a test criterion. We rather consider the testing process as a 
whole. This allows us to give account of such dynamic features. Incremental test 
construction and optimization can then easily be modelled. Also, we can localize 
precisely the 'likely' feature of testing, and model other actions as formal manipula- 
tions of well-defined mathematical objects. 
Our theory of testing shows that all specifications are not naturally testable. They 
should at least be purely universally quantified. Algebraic data type specifications, 
for entirely different reasons, are precisely of that kind. Moreover, the concept of 
hierarchical (algebraic) specification leads naturally to uniformity hypotheses for 
lower-level sorts and regularity hypotheses for the sort of interest. Assuming that 
algebras are finitely generated with respect o hierarchy allows to design the battery 
of tests at an abstract level of denotation. The size of the denotation of a data can 
be considered as a measure of its computational complexity. Our theory provides 
therefore atesting strategy for hierarchical lgebraic specifications. A semi-automatic 
tool for testing algebraic specification is currently under development on this basis 
(see [4] for details and experimental results). PROLOG is used to generate specifically 
terms satisfying some constraints. Observe that PROLOG specifications are also purely 
universal. The incremental resolution strategy of PROLOG yields regularity 
hypotheses. Also, solutions involving free variables correspond precisely to unifor- 
mity subdomains. Purely universally quantified specifications, but the use of regular- 
ity and uniformity hypotheses, appear therefore as a basic requirement for testability. 
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